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This paper addresses the issue of science related human rights. It begins by showing 
how science was central yet paradoxically peripheral to the Universal Declaration of 
Human rights; this is followed by a discussion of the negligible impact of the Nuremberg 
Code, and the patient rights therein encoded, in the immediate post war. Two conclusions 
are drawn from these preliminary explorations. First, the interconnection between human 
rights and science was mediated via the sacralisation of the latter’s autonomy from social 
capture, which in turn limited the types of science related human rights claims that could 
be made. Second, the explanatory gaze of social scientists should be focused on exploring 
the concrete configuration of social, political, economic and cultural forces that provide 
human rights with social efficacy. In other words human rights need to be conceptualised 
as ordinary objects of sociological analysis.
These two points are further elaborated through a historical case study of the 
emergence of patient rights in the US, the most important science related human rights to 
date. This is followed by a discussion on the prospects for science related human rights in 
the bio and nano era by showing how the knowledge society, risk, scientific citizenship and 
ELSIfication (i.e. the development of research programs concerned with eliciting ethical, 
legal and social implications of genomics, nanotechnology, etc.) have weakened, but by no 
means done away with science’s once sacred autonomy. This means that there are currently 
new opportunities for the emergence of science related human rights claims. It is concluded 
that science related human rights also raise important issues regarding hybridity and the 
conceptualisation of human vulnerability.
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Introduction
This paper is conceived as an attempt to contribute to the development 
of a sociological approach to science related human rights. Despite the field 
of social studies of science’s impressively diverse growth and the emergence of 
a sociological interest in human rights, there has been very little sociological 
work that has addressed the specificity of science related human rights. In 
this paper I focus on how human rights have become intertwined with 
science by drawing attention to how science was both present and absent in 
the context of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and by 
examining the negligible impact of the Nuremberg Code in the post war, 
despite the normative appeal of its proclamation of individual autonomy and 
voluntary consent. Drawing on the emerging scholarship on the sociology of 
human rights, I then go on to argue that one of the ways in which sociology 
can contribute to understanding human rights is by making human rights 
ordinary objects of analysis. In order to illustrate this approach I analyse the 
social trends and processes that led to the institutionalisation of the 
autonomy of research subjects and informed consent in the US, the most 
important human right vis-à-vis science to date. I also attempt to show how, 
in the postwar period, the sacralisation of science’s autonomy blocked efforts 
to broaden citizens’ rights vis-à-vis science. In the second part of the paper, in 
an effort to understand the prospects of making human rights claims in the 
context of the bio and nano era, I examine how the relationship between the 
knowledge society, risk, scientific citizenship and ELSIfication (i.e. the 
development of research programs concerned with eliciting ethical, legal and 
social implications of genomics, nanotechnology, etc.) have contributed to 
the erosion, but by no means the elimination, of science’s once sacred 
autonomy. I conclude, by briefly discussing the need not only to make science 
related human rights ordinary but also hybrid, and by drawing attention to 
the relevance but also the difficulty of mobilising the notion of harm and 
vulnerability in the context of science related human rights.
Linking human tights to science in the UDHR and the 
Nuremberg Doctors’ Trial
The awareness of the Nazi genocidal atrocities was, in the words of 
Richard Falk, “an essential aspect of the moral consciousness that dominated 
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the period during and immediately after World War II” (Falk 2009, p. 83). 
Indeed, he goes on to argue that structurally, ideologically, and geopolitically 
the post-war period was so little propitious to the moral aspirations and 
sentiments crystallised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) that were it not for “the impact of the Holocaust on the political and 
moral imagination, it is unlikely that even the modest moves to promote 
international human rights would have been taken in the post-war period of 
1945-50” (Falk 2009, p. 88; cf. Somers and Roberts 2008, p. 392). Interwoven 
in this moral consciousness was the shocking realisation of the enabling role 
played by science in the creation of the Nazi political imaginary and in the 
logistics of mass extermination. However, when Alexie P. Pavlov, the Soviet 
representative in the United Nations Human Rights Commission, asserted 
that “[a]n atmosphere of terror prevails throughout the world … It is a terror 
owing to the application of scientific discoveries for destructive purposes” 
(Cited in Claude [2002, p. 31]), it is likely that those present were not only 
thinking about the Holocaust but also about “American responsibility for 
nuclear destruction in Japan, of the British blanket bombing of civilians in 
Dresden, and of chemical and biological warfare dreaded by everyone” 
(Claude 2002, p. 31). 
In effect, Richard Pierre Claude, one of the few scholars to explore the 
links between the UDHR and science, claims that careful examination of the 
United Nations Human Rights Commission’s deliberations reveals something 
of an implicit grand theory, in which science and human rights were 
somewhat naively linked in the pursuit of world peace:
Reduced to its barest elements the underlying logic for a new strategic plan 
for world peace, said:
•  Misguided applications of science in the hands of megalomaniac 
politicians = war
•  Societies empowered by human rights = peaceful social structures;
•  Ergo science advancing human rights-friendly society = peace (Claude 
2002, p. 34).
Consequently, it was the social misappropriation of science that needed to be 
checked rather than scientific activity itself. This understanding held across 
the ideological divide; as is revealed in Pavlov’s swipe at the Americans 
claiming that they were “creating a danger of extinguishing disinterested 
scientific research in United States universities in favour of laboratories for 
military purposes” (cited in Claude [2002, p. 31]). However when Pavlov 
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when on to assert that “[w]e need to recognize and proclaim the people’s 
right to enjoy the applications of science mobilized in the service of progress 
and democracy,” and “the causes of peace and international cooperation” 
(cited in Claude [2002, p. 33]), Eleanor Roosevelt, the committee’s chair 
person rebutted: “It seems dangerous to adopt a text which could be 
interpreted as a pretext for the enslavement of science” (cited in Claude 
[2002, p. 33]), while the British representative added that “[s]cience should 
not be placed at the service of an ideology falsely called ‘progress’ as it had 
been recently when invoked by propagandists of a doctrine bestowing racial 
superiority upon Germany” (cited in Claude [2002, p. 33]). Similarly the 
Belgian delegate chimed in that science should not be assigned a political 
mission, whilst the Australian representative proclaimed: “the sole aim of 
science could only be the quest for truth” (cited in Claude [2002, p. 33]). 
Discursively, then, precisely because of the horror of the Nazi genocidal 
atrocities and despite the devastation with which science and technology had 
been mobilised by others in the Second World War as with the blanket 
bombings of German cities and the detonation of nuclear weapons over 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was science’s capture by totalitarian ideologies 
that needed to be avoided. Insofar as science was free to embark on its “quest 
for truth,” it would be possible, as article 27 of the UDHR stipulates, for all to 
“share in scientific advancement and its benefits.” Moreover, the rights 
addressed to everyone, provided 
safeguards cognate to the needs of the scientific enterprise because free 
speech, assembly, and participation as well as rights to intellectual property 
characterize the conditions scientists need to pursue their professional work 
effectively because these rights bear on the public’s prospect for enjoying 
and sharing the application of science (Claude 2002, p. 35).
Nothing more was needed to align science with the progress of human rights. 
Subsequently this framing was incorporated in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in article 15.3. 
In the US post-war period, the coupling of scientists’ right to autonomy 
with progress and beneficence had been crystallised in 1945 by Vannevar 
Bush’s report titled Science — The Endless Frontier. Bush, an MIT engineer, 
had chaired the National Defense Research Committee, which had been tasked 
with coordinating the cooperation of civilian scientists with the military 
during the Second World War. In his report, to President Truman, he argued 
that the government funding for scientific research that had been ramped up 
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for the war effort should continue, and should be channelled amongst other 
things towards the “war on disease,” without completely dismissing its 
continued relevance to national security. The document, which in effect 
constituted science’s social contract, is discursively organised around the 
quite familiar distinction between basic and applied science. The former, he 
wrote “results from the free play of free intellects, working on subjects of their 
own choice, in the manner dictated by their curiosity for exploration of the 
unknown. Freedom of inquiry must be preserved under any plan for 
Government support of science” (Bush 1945). The role of applied science, 
predominantly one for industry, was to translate the findings of basic 
research into technologies that would lead to national progress, prosperity, 
and well being. In Britain, a similar defence of scientific autonomy had been 
enunciated, the Haldane Principle, in the 1918 Haldane Report that led to the 
creation of Britain’s first research council, the Medical Research Council. In a 
sense, the UDHR merely restated a conception of the autonomy of science, 
and the concomitant rights of scientists, that were already institutionalised or 
in the process of being institutionalised. It used the atrocities of Nazi science 
to signify the dangers associated with meddling with science’s autonomy.
The Nuremberg Doctor’s Trial is a second site where the possibility of 
invoking human rights in order to curtail science’s autonomy emerges. 
Conducted under US auspices, 23 defendants were charged with “subjecting 
unwilling victims to medical procedures that were loosely called ‘scientific 
experiments’, thereby having caused their death, disfigurement, or disability” 
(Jonsen 1998, p. 134). As is well known, the tribunal’s judgement included a 
ten point ethical code for the regulation of experimentation on human 
subjects known as the Nuremberg Code (Annas and Grodin 1992, p. 4). Its 
first point enshrined the principle that “the voluntary consent of the human 
subject is absolutely essential,” the remaining points dealt with the design, the 
realisation of, and the balancing of risks in biomedical experimentation. In 
effect it enunciated a number of constraints on the autonomy of medical and 
scientific practice. Subsequently this principle would appear both in article 7 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and in 
the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki developed by World Medical Association. 
Yet, it would be thirty years before the discursive, political and 
institutional basis enabling the enforcement of the principles enunciated in 
the Nuremberg Code would develop into actionable rights in the US and 
elsewhere. Once again, it seems like the awareness of and the horror 
produced by the Nazi atrocities made it possible to discursively link the 
corruption of medical-scientific practice to totalitarianism. This link is 
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explicitly made by Dr. Leo Alexander, a Tufts Medical School psychiatrist, 
who was associated with the Nuremberg Doctor’s Trial tribunal, in an article 
published in New England Journal of Medicine in 1949. In the article, titled 
Medical Science under Dictatorship, Alexander argued that all forms of 
dictatorship, regardless of their ideological leaning, were characterized by 
their espousal of a “Hegelian … ‘rational utility’” in which “doctrine and 
planning […] replaced moral, ethical and religious values” (Alexander 1949, 
p. 39). He then went on to explain how propaganda, the legalisation of 
euthanasia, and the development of both a science of annihilation and 
medico-military research had contributed to the denaturing of medical and 
scientific practice in Nazi Germany. Although in the last section of the article, 
he raised the issue of the extent to which American physicians had been 
“infected with Hegelian, cold-blooded, utilitarian philosophy,” he nonetheless 
concluded by listing a number of prophylactic counter-trends associated with 
democratic society, amongst which he included the development of the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
Consequently, the conclusion to be drawn by those not indicted in the 
Nuremberg Doctor’s trial was that “It was a good code for barbarians but an 
unnecessary code for ordinary physicians” (Katz cited in Jonsen [1998, p. 
137]). This explains the surprisingly low levels of coverage of the trials in the 
US (Rothman 2003, p. 62). As David Rothman notes, “[t]he events described 
at Nuremberg were not perceived by researchers or commentators to be 
directly relevant to the American scene. The violations had been the work of 
Nazis, not doctors; the guilty parties were Hitler’s henchmen, not scientists” 
(Rothman 2003, p. 63). This despite the fact that many German perpetrators 
were university trained and appointed researchers with distinguished careers. 
In the US, the conditions of possibility for the development of 
enforceable human rights vis-à-vis science in the form of the rights of 
patients and research subjects arises, as I show below, from the intersection of 
a series of events with longer term trends, which led amongst other things to 
the emergence and institutionalisation of a new form of professional 
expertise, bioethics. Curiously, however, when one looks at accounts of the 
development of bioethics and its contribution to the development of patient 
rights, there is a tendency to invoke the Nuremberg Code as launching off 
point, this despite the fact it had a negligible impact on regulating the 
relationship between scientists and their research subjects. 
In some sense, this is an artefact of modes of disciplinary knowledge 
production. As Talcott Parsons succinctly noted philosophy as a knowledge 
production practice “attempts to achieve rational cognitive understanding of 
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human experience by methods other than those of empirical science” 
(Parsons 1949, p. 21). Thus, for a bioethicist the principles enumerated in the 
Nuremberg Code when not “the most ancient of ethical maxims of medicine, 
‘do no harm’” (cf. Jonsen 2007, p. 8) provide adequate starting points for a 
reflection of the rights of a patient vis-à-vis her physician, without regard for 
the presence or absence of the specific social relations and processes that 
underwrite those rights. Threads from the contemporary social fabric are 
used to weave a social cloth that stretches out and clothes the past. Legal 
modes of knowledge production, for different reasons, also display an 
equivalent disregard for the empirical aspects of the social once the “facts” of 
the case have been determined by reference to the pertinent laws, precedents 
or authorities (López and Lunau, forthcoming). 
There can be little doubt that the semantic affinity between human 
rights and universality makes possible a variety of politically engaging and 
normatively compelling discursive effects, organised around discursive nodes 
such as natural rights, justice, timelessness, inclusiveness, internationalism, 
cosmopolitanism and globality. Indeed as Bryan Turner has shown, it even 
makes possible the development of a persuasive normative sociological 
project grounded in the omnipresence of human vulnerability and 
institutional fragility (Turner 2006). However, I want to go on to argue that 
sociology can also contribute to our understanding, and even to the efficacy, 
of human rights by making them ordinary.
Making human rights ordinary 
In advocating for the need to make human rights ordinary, I have in 
mind the kinds of sociological and social science research that has made it 
possible to evade the necessity of either naturalising human rights, as some 
sort of quasi-natural law phenomenon, or reducing them to an imperialist or 
colonialist ruse (cf. Morgan 2009). In this vein, Anthony Woodiwiss has 
argued that a more promising point of departure for a sociological 
understanding of rights is found in the figure of human sacrifice rather than 
in a mythically retrojected social contract. This is because 
just as human sacrifice made sacred both the individual human being and 
the inequalities that made sacrifice possible, so the sacrifices required by an 
emergent capitalism made sacred certain aspects of the individual life as 
god-given, “natural” rights and the inequalities that made the same 
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capitalism possible. In other words, both “natural” rights and human 
sacrifice are instances of unequal rather than equal exchange (Woodiwiss 
2005, p. 9).
When seen in this way, sociologically at least, human rights, like all socially 
enforceable rights, offer protection by simultaneously sacralising some 
dimensions of an individual’s life while sacrificing others. In this sense, 
making human rights ordinary requires that we treat them as “simply a 
subset of a larger set of social relations that produce and enforce behavioural 
expectations, a subset distinguished by their legal form and their focus on the 
prevention of the abuse of power” (Woodiwiss 2005, p. 4). Said differently, as 
Somers and Roberts write, “Rights — whether human or citizenship rights or 
other kinds — are the label we use to characterize certain kinds of social 
arrangements (Roberts 2008, p. 413). Consequently, the explanatory gaze of 
social scientists who accept the premise of the ordinariness of human rights 
should be focused on exploring the configuration of social, political, 
economic and cultural forces that make human rights appear in their 
different registers, i.e. “normative moral aspiration,” “codification and 
doctrine,” and “mechanisms and institutions of enforcement” (Somers and 
Roberts 2008, p. 388).
With this in mind I want to look at the social processes in the US that 
opened up a field of social relations in which it became possible to mobilise 
rights, more specifically the rights of patients and research subjects, in order 
to minimally curtail the sacralised autonomy of science and medical practice. 
Following this, I will explore how developments in biotechnology, and more 
recently in nanotechnology, have led to the expansion of human rights vis-à-
vis science, though for the most part in the “normative moral aspiration” 
register. Thus what follows can be taken as a contribution to the already 
existing and growing body of sociological research that takes human rights 
seriously precisely by making them ordinary objects of empirical analysis.
Constraining science in the postwar? 
As noted above, the UDHR and the non-pertinence of the Nuremberg 
Code to anyone but “Nazi barbarians” articulated the potential danger posed 
by science as resulting from its possible misappropriation by a totalitarian 
state. In so doing it set up democracy and scientific autonomy as the 
bulwarks against the possibility of science going bad, whilst providing the 
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framework through which all might “share in scientific advancement and its 
benefits.” That said, though the shock waves of the detonation of atomic 
bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki were deflected from the text of the 
UDHR, its fallout in post-war US society was less easily contained, not least 
because it was precisely some of the physicists whose work had contributed 
to making possible the atomic bomb who would subsequently recoil in 
horror and forcefully make public their anxiety regarding the post-war 
development of science. In this way, not only did they raise concerns 
regarding nuclear energy; they also addressed the broader question of the 
social regulation of science (Stevens 2000, p. 11; cf. Moore 1996). Though the 
discourse was not framed in terms of human rights, it nonetheless opened up 
a discursive space in which it was possible to think about constraining 
science for the greater good, disturbing the link between scientific autonomy 
and social beneficence.
Tina Stevens argues that this was not the first time that scientists had 
grappled with the political and social dimensions of their research, but it was
the first time that scientists with the celebrity of the atomic scientists had 
made their case in so public a fashion. Their influence was extensive, in 
part, because of the public’s fascination with those who had played such a 
crucial role in constructing “a doomsday weapon that had killed more than 
a hundred thousand human beings” (Stevens 2000, pp. 11-12).
By the late 50s and early 60s the political climate produced by loyalty oaths 
and security investigations would chill much of the activity of the atomic 
science movement (Moore 1996, p. 1600). However, not before this 
movement had exerted considerable influence on a group of influential 
internationally-networked geneticists who would draw parallels between 
atomic science and genetics, when not direct links (Stevens 2000, p. 12). The 
latter was expressed as alarm over the impact of nuclear radiation on the 
quality of a populations’ genetic material. For instance, the 1946 Nobel 
Laureate in Medicine Hermann Müller publicly expressed his disquiet 
regarding the prospect that radiation from nuclear weapons, as well as other 
sources, was causing genetic mutations, the sum of which he believed was 
causing a “genetic load” that threatened the future existence of humanity 
(Evans 2002, pp. 49-50). More broadly, though traditional, or to use John 
Evan’s term “mainline” eugenics, had been terminally discredited as a 
consequence of its association with Nazi Germany, this did not foreclose its 
re-emergence in the 50s under the guise of “reform eugenics” in the US. 
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Whereas the antecedent variant had come to be understood as expressing an 
irrational and unscientific race and class prejudice, reform eugenicists 
believed that the “‘valuable’ characteristics to be encouraged in the human 
species were found across all class and racial groups,” thus they replaced the 
racial preoccupations of traditional eugenics “with concern about the ‘genetic 
quality’ — or, for the pessimists, ‘the genetic deterioration’ — of the entire 
population” (Evans 2002, p. 49). 
Other geneticists cognisant of the potential revolutionary implications of 
genetics were nonetheless alarmed about the emerging reform eugenics 
discourse, which urged public intervention to curb the debasement of the 
genetic grade of the population. For instance in 1963, the Italian-born but 
British based geneticist Guido Pontecorvo, argued, at a Ohio Wesleyan 
University Conference, that it was imperative to publicly address the possible 
impacts of genetic research: “[o]nly in this way” he asserted “can we hope to 
develop ethical standards and democratic means…The alternative is a wise 
oligarchy knowing and doing what they think good for the rest in the way so 
vividly pictured by Aldous Huxley 40 years ago in Brave New World” (cited in 
Stevens [2000, p. 19]).
Stevens sums up the impact of the atomic science movement and the 
politicised geneticists in the following way:
Affected by the responsible science movement and the experience of the 
atomic physicists, scientists in other fields endeavoured to alert the public to 
the existence of the biological revolution and to entreat others, from outside 
science, to assist in the creation of ethical standards to manage this 
revolution. The calls from such scientists were met by critiques that emerged 
in the incendiary cultural environment of the sixties (Stevens 2000, p. 19).
Public intellectuals such as Lewis Mumford, Herbert Marcuse, Jacques Ellul 
and Theodore Rozak would develop more wide-ranging critiques of sciences’ 
adverse impacts. Indeed by the mid-60s science and scientists “were being 
blamed for among other things, the war in Vietnam, alienation, decline in the 
quality of life even as material prosperity increased, and a multitude of 
environmental problems (Moore 1996, p. 1601). Despite this turbulence, as 
Kelly Moore has shown, generally scientists were able “to maintain the power 
to make decisions about science,” and in this way fend off encroachments on 
their autonomy. Discursively, they did so by claiming that they “acted in the 
interests of the public”; practically, they embedded these claims in 
“organizations that now had ongoing linkages to various groups of 
 Making Human Rights Ordinary in the Bio and Nanotech Era 79
nonscientists” thus performatively showcasing “in public settings their 
commitment to serving the public” (Moore 1996, p. 1620). This, however, 
was not the case in the context of biomedical research, where the emergence 
of a new form of expertise, i.e. bioethics, was able to make some inroads into 
science’s sacred autonomy through the championing of patients’ rights. 
Although the contribution of bioethics to the institutionalisation of patient 
rights was significant, its success has to be analysed in a broader social and 
historical context, to which I now turn.
The emergence of patient rights in the US  
The twentieth century saw a number of trends in the evolution of 
medicine that would, by the 1960s, test when not entirely undermine the 
relationships of trust that had traditionally governed the interpersonal 
relationships between family physicians and patients. These included the 
increased salience and dominance of scientific medicine, the consecration of 
the hospital as the zenith of medical practice, and the multiplications of 
medical specialties. These trends contributed to making doctors Strangers at 
the Bedside, the title of David Rothman’s influential history on the curbing of 
biomedical autonomy. However, it was not just that doctors become 
strangers; patients were equally transformed through these processes as they 
metamorphosed into research subjects (Rothman 2003, p. 107). 
In addition to this, the development of new medical technologies, 
particularly those related to emergency medicine — e.g. intensive care units, 
neo-natal intensive care units, organ transplants — also introduced all 
manner of questions pertaining to the distinctions between life and death 
that largely surpassed physicians’ epistemological jurisdiction and the 
existing ethical codes that governed their profession. In this way, an opening 
was provided initially to theologians, but more significantly to philosophers 
and lawyers who were able to successfully expand their epistemological 
jurisdictions into the medical terrain by establishing themselves as 
bioethicists. As I will show below, the transformation of applied ethics into a 
social technology for the production of consensus contributed to securing the 
stake of the philosophers who ventured into this new terrain.
Law’s success has to be understood in part as a consequence of its 
salience and the crucial role of the courts in the civil rights and related 
movements. Indeed as Somers and Roberts note, the initial successes “made 
the civil rights movement the model template for future law and social 
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change discourse” (Somers and Roberts 2008, p. 397). In this vein, Rothman 
writes that
The movements shared an unwillingness to accede to the discretionary 
authority of whites, men, husbands, parents, clinical investigators, mental 
hospitals superintendents, elected officials, and of course, doctors, especially 
when they were males practicing obstetrics, gynaecology, or psychiatry. All 
the movements subscribed to a fierce antipaternalism, a dogged rejection of 
the principles of beneficence, and a persistent determination to let 
constituents speak for themselves and define their own interests. Autonomy 
and consent became the bywords (Rothman 2003, p. 263).
Moreover, as Rothman goes on to argue both the notions of autonomy and 
consent owe more to the courts and to legal discourse than to medical ethics 
or applied philosophy (Rothman 2003, p. 264). Indeed, informed consent in a 
medical context was given legal standings in US courts in the 1960s (Hoeyer 
2007, p. 120). However, notwithstanding the heightened sense of the efficacy 
of law deriving from its successes in the civil rights context, the contribution 
of the disciplinary tools of law as a knowledge production practice should not 
be underestimated (cf. López and Lunau, forthcoming).
Besides the jurisdictional expansion, the heightened sense of 
contestation of specific social groups, and the longer term trends in the 
development of medicine noted above, it is important to also register the 
impact of the pursuit of health as a national objective and the related increase 
of publicly financed biomedical research. These in turn created a demand for 
new administrative and regulatory policies but also for public accountability. 
Amongst other things, the latter was fuelled by a series of well publicised 
exposés that revealed that individuals who had not or could not have 
consented had been put at risk as subjects of biomedical research. Famously, 
in 1966 Henry K. Beecher, a Harvard Medical School anaesthesiologist, 
published an article in the New England Journal of Medicine, ironically the 
same journal in which Dr. Leo Alexander had published his Medical Science 
under Dictatorship, in which he claimed that 
Evidence is at hand that many of the patients in the examples to follow never 
had the risk satisfactorily explained to them, and it seems obvious that 
further hundreds have not known that they were the subjects of an 
experiment although grave consequences have been suffered as a direct 
result of the experiments described here (Alexander 1966, p. 1354).
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In the article he goes on to describe twenty-two instances, “drawn from 
published articles by leading research scientists” in which the researchers 
“exposed patients to excessive risks, ignored the need for consent, used poor, 
mentally incapacitated persons, and withheld therapies of known efficacy” 
(Jonsen 1998, p. 144). Six years later, the New York Times broke the Tuskegee 
Story in which 
For forty years, the United States Public Health Service has conducted a 
study in which human beings [all African American] with syphilis, who 
were induced to serve as guinea pigs, have gone without treatment for the 
disease…the study was conducted to determine from autopsies what the 
disease does to the human body” (cited in Jonsen [1998, p. 147]).
It was in this context that in 1979 the National Commission for the Protection 
of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Research published its 
report, The Belmont Report. The commission had been tasked with 
identifying “the principles that should underlie the conduct of biomedical 
and behavioral research involving human subjects, and to develop guidelines 
which should be followed to ensure that such research is conducted in 
accordance with those principles’ (Bernard Gert, Charles M. Culver, and K. 
Danner Clouser 1997, p. 73). According to Albert Jonsen, a commission 
participant, the members of the commission developed a new way of doing 
ethics:
[b]y going beyond the often chaotic debate that rages around moral issues 
and beyond the private ruminations of scholars. In this way, a public moral 
discourse began to evolve, in which a group of citizens seeks the facts of the 
case, asks for scholarly advice, and enters a debate with a view to resolution 
(Jonsen 1998, p. 101)
In other words, a new dispositif for the production of consensus became 
available. As Evans notes, it “was portrayed as a ‘philosophy of the people’ — 
a system that would represent how the public would make decisions if given 
the opportunity (Evans 2002, p. 73). Out of this process emerged Principlism: 
an applied ethics approach, with significant debts to law, based on the 
understanding that the relations between human subjects and researchers 
ought to be governed by the principles of autonomy, beneficence and justice 
(López 2004a). More concretely, informed consent, and its supporting 
practices, became the dominant mechanism through which constraint could 
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be applied on biomedical research through the exercise of individual 
autonomy. Following this, a complex process unfolds through which 
Principlism and informed consent become the dominant paradigms in 
funding councils, Institutional Review Boards (IRB), academic journals, 
medical schools, and bioethics programs (Evans 2002, pp. 89-98), with the 
bulk of the federal regulation falling in place by 1991 (Goldner 1993, p. 99).
In this way, the autonomy of research subjects, a human right enunciated 
in the Nuremberg Code, the UDHR and the ICCPR in a “moral normative 
register,” has become institutionalised in the US through the construct of 
informed consent. Although it would possible to look back and see the 
development as a gradual extension of an idea seeded in the past — a 
frequent narrative trope in human rights discourse (Woodiwiss 2009, p. 107) 
— sociologically it is better understood as the outcome of the concatenation 
of social processes and events that produced the transformations of social 
relations described above. I would like to develop two points from this 
discussion. 
The first is that this specific human right, autonomy grounded in 
informed consent, arises in the context of what Woodiwiss has called the 
“major tradition” (Woodiwiss 2009, p. 108), that is to say the narrower set of 
civil and political rights associated with the liberal emphasis on individual 
autonomy and self-determination, as distinct from the “minor tradition” 
based on the principle of reciprocity. Despite this, scholars have identified 
important shortcomings concerning its efficacy (cf. Corrigan 2003; Corrigan 
et al. 2009). This is hardly surprising, seen from the perspective of the 
Woodiwissian figure of rights as sacrifice, the ability to circumscribe the 
power of biomedicine by sacralising informed consent serves to reproduce 
and consecrate the inequality between research subject and researcher and 
the particular social, economic and political relations through which health 
as a social phenomenon and medical practice position individuals. Moreover, 
the question of adequacy becomes even more complicated when the “ideals” 
of informed consent and autonomy are taken abroad to contexts governed by 
different configurations of social relations. In particular it has been noted that 
in the absence of cultural references and social arrangements that create a 
field for the exercise of autonomy, informed consent is meaningless at best 
(Claude 2002, p. 89). More worrisome is the fact that as the recruitment of 
research subjects has become more costly and constrained in Western 
countries as a result of strict regulations and safety and compensation 
measures, courtesy of patient rights, a new global political economy of 
clinical drug trials is taking form in non-Western counties where inadequate 
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regulations, illiteracy, poverty and vulnerability keep costs down (Nundy, 
Chir, and Gulhati 2005, p. 1633). Moreover, as Sunder Rajan (2008) has 
shown, even in the context of well regulated sites such as clinical research 
organizations (CROs) in India, ethical safeguards contribute to the 
depolitisation of the research subjects whose physiologies perform the high 
risk labour required to get drugs to market in biocapitalism. Thus, although I 
will not develop this idea further here, it is clear that informed consent as an 
instantiation of the human right of autonomy is vulnerable to the criticisms 
that are raised more broadly regarding the insufficiency of human rights in 
the major liberal tradition, i.e. the narrower range of civil and political rights, 
both in those social contexts in which there is a socially-structural affinity as 
is the case in Western countries, but especially outside of them.
The second point is that currently, and no doubt related to processes in 
other spheres of human rights (cf. Blau and Moncada 2005; Woodiwiss 2005, 
chap. 11-12) there is evidence of a potential for expanding the scope of 
human rights vis-à-vis science. For instance a number of European countries 
have explicitly invoked human rights in the context of healthcare, 
biotechnology, and the environment by emphasising notions such as 
“solidarity, human dignity and collective good” (Knowles 2001, p. 256). In 
1997, the General Conference of UNESCO adopted the Universal Declaration 
on the Human Genome and Human Rights (UDHGHR), the first universal 
human rights tool dealing with biology. More importantly, however, human 
dignity and the human rights to health (Benatar 2000; Freeman 2009), food 
(Gonzalez-Pelaez 2005; Shiva 2000), and culture have been summoned in a 
variety of contexts to contest intellectual property rights (Cullet 2007; Sell 
2001), repel the encroachment of agricultural and medical biotechnology 
(Krimsky and Shorett 2005), and rebuff biopiracy (Greene 2002; Lock 2001; 
Katy Moran, Steven R. King, and Thomas J. Carlson 2001). Thus the human 
rights’ “minor tradition” vis-à-vis science, i.e. the notion that human rights 
are sometimes better served by constraining science’s autonomy, finally seems 
to be getting traction. This tradition, as I have shown above, surfaced in the 
deliberations of the United Nations Human Rights Commission but was 
excluded from the UDHR; it reappeared in the US post-war responsible 
science movement and the radical critiques of science but was shut out by the 
sacralisation of science’s autonomy. However, it is far too tempting to read 
this, unsociologically, as an instance of some developmental logic intrinsic to 
human rights. In order to foreclose this possibility and to see these potential 
rights as ordinary, I want to outline some of the trends and processes that 
have made it possible for human rights as well as other social arrangements 
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to question science’s sacred autonomy.
Science’s autonomy in the knowledge Society
One of the reasons why it is now possible to question science’s once 
sacred autonomy is that to a very significant extent its social-structural 
conditions of possibility have been transformed. The distinction between a 
self-governing autonomous “pure” science that enabled “the free play of free 
intellects” and technology, which was central to the Vannevar Bush vision, is 
no longer operative. Indeed science studies scholars have argued that insofar 
as contemporary scientific activity is organised around the pursuit of more 
immediate social goals, we are now within the territory of technoscience. For 
instance, in their seminal text, The New Production of Knowledge, Gibbons et 
al. (1994) made a distinction between Mode 1 and Mode 2 science. Whereas 
in the former the development of science is understood to be powered by the 
interests and curiosity of the scientific community narrowly conceived, in the 
latter it is oriented towards problem-solving in the context of application. 
Consequently Mode 2 science is made to be more susceptible to the needs of 
the different “stakeholders,” and is required to account for itself more 
pragmatically in terms of social benefits, innovation, and contributions to 
economic growth. In this sense, according to Nowotny et al., “not only does 
science speak to society (it always has), but the conditions are established in 
which society can ‘speak back’ to science” (Nowotny et al. 2002, p. 245). Seen 
thus, the mobilisation of support and resources from diverse and 
heterogeneous constituencies, such as venture capital, NGOs, regulators, the 
media, citizen groups, patient groups, consumer association and regulators 
becomes an integral dimension of technoscientific practice (Nowotny et al. 
2002, p. 246).
These changes of course cannot be understood as deriving from a 
developmental logic immanent to science itself, they are better grasped in the 
context of the social, political, economic, and ideological transformations 
associated with what Daniel Bell had prefigured as a Post-Industrial and 
today is more commonly referred to as the knowledge society or the 
knowledge economy (Nowotny et al. 2002). As a political imaginary, the 
discourse of the knowledge society synergistically welds together new modes 
of knowledge production, innovation and entrepreneurship, freedom from 
restraint, global competitiveness, economic growth and national wellbeing. 
As a social formation, it has required amongst other things 
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the widespread currency of neoliberal rationalities as modes of economic 
and political governance, the increasing corporatization of universities and 
of funding councils, changes in tax regimes for R&D, the institutionalization 
of new private-public funding hybrids, modifications to patent law, attempts 
to strengthen intellectual property protection at global level, developments 
in technology as well as the increased saliency of globalist discourse (López 
and Robertson 2007, p. 210).
Human Rights in the bio and nanotech era
Although information and communications technologies were and 
continue to be a major axis of the knowledge economy, biotechnology has 
been no less significant; in fact, in the early 80s, genetic engineering was 
depicted as “the core technology of a new industry, biotechnology, which was 
expected to have a revolutionary impact on both society and economy” 
(Gottweis 1998, p. 153; cf. Jasanoff 2005). The ensuing “Biomania” condensed 
a number of elements that confirmed biotechnology’s privileged place within 
the emerging knowledge economy. These included the market rallies around 
the first public listing of biotech companies, the hype and hope with which its 
technologies were projected into the future, and the perception in Europe 
that it was necessary to follow the US lead down the biotech path in order to 
remain competitive (Gottweis 1998, p. 156). 
Melinda Cooper has persuasively argued that biotechnology’s distinctive 
position within the knowledge economy has to be analysed in the context of 
the decline of US competitiveness in the 60s and 70s, the related perception 
that the economic model, which had served the US so well in the postwar, 
was in crisis as well as the growing impact of the environmental movement. 
This perception of crisis was condensed in the Club of Rome’s world futures 
report of 1972, which ominously not only put in question the postwar model 
of economic growth but also the biosphere’s capacity to continue supporting 
life (Cooper 2008, p. 16). This was because the economic growth needed to 
service the exponential increase in population would collide with 
insurmountable limits: “These limits were of two kinds, consisting not only 
in the depletion of non-renewable resources but also in the steady 
environmental buildup of toxic, non-biodegradable waste” (Cooper 2008, p. 
16). The organic intellectuals of the new right and of the post-industrial 
society heavily criticised the report for being trapped in the paradigm of 
quantitative intensification and thus failing to grasp the potential associated 
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with a qualitative change in the organisation of social and economic life, in 
which an innovation-based economy would harness the power of human 
creativity not only to overcome economic decline, but also to surmount the 
so-called environmental limits (Cooper 2008, p. 18). 
Petrochemical industries, which produced all manner of chemical 
products, plastics, fabrics and agricultural goods, such as fertilizers and 
herbicides, were particularly hard hit by the economic downturn and the rise 
of environmentalism. Major pharmaceutical companies were also vulnerable 
because their product development pipes were running dry, their compounds 
were losing market share to generics, and they were also receiving flak from 
patient rights advocacy groups. It is in this context that biotechnology’s 
potential for the knowledge economy was cultured by the major 
petrochemical and pharmaceutical companies, which seized on the 
development in recombinant DNA technologies to re-brand themselves as 
“purveyors of the new, clean life science technologies” (Cooper 2008, pp. 
21-22). Thus the 80s and 90s saw the consolidation of the Life Sciences 
Company approach, spearheaded by such industrial giants as Monsanto, 
Novartis, Aventis, Zeneca, Bayer and BASF (cf. Bowring 2003, chap. 3). 
Moreover because biotechnology was discursively framed as mobilising the 
natural potential of “life” it was possible to position it against the toxic and 
waste-producing activities of the Fordist industrial economy:
the unique character of the technology is that it is fully biological, composed 
of the workings of genes, proteins, cells and tissues. On the one hand, 
biotechnology appears not to be a technology at all, but only “life itself ” 
rearranged or recontextualised, but nevertheless performing the same 
functions it always has (Thacker 2005, p. XIX).
Consequently, discursively biotechnology’s potential within the imaginary of 
the knowledge economy resided in being able to overcome “the geochemical 
laws ruling over Fordist industrial production” with “the much more benign, 
regenerative possibilities of biomolecular production” (Cooper 2008, p. 23). 
In this way, the future could become associated not with limits to growth, but 
precisely with the erasure of the very notion of limits, which perhaps goes a 
long way towards explaining the tendency, noted by science studies scholars 
and others, for extreme hype in the biotechnological sector where “various 
areas of technological innovation become saturated with stratospherically 
high expectations of immanent and revolutionary change” (Brown 2003, p. 
4). 
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According to Cooper, the notion of “promise” is a vital dimension of the 
knowledge economy, hence also of biotechnology, and of the neoliberal 
rationality that underpins it: “promise is what enables production to remain 
in a permanent state of self-transformation, arming it with a capacity to 
respond to the most unpredictable of circumstances, to anticipate and escape 
the possible “limit” to its growth long before it has even actualized” (2008, p. 
24). Because of this, speculation in the form of potential economic windfalls 
or through the extrapolation of the therapeutic or beneficent future effects of 
specific biotechnologies provides not only a mechanism for locking in the 
diverse constituencies that need to be mobilised within the context of Mode 2 
science, but also reiterates biotechnology’s conditions of emergence within 
the imaginary of the knowledge economy. It also in part explains the 
centrality of patents, not only in terms of temporal extension of patents and 
securing their operability globally, which have been so important for the 
biotechnology industry (cf. Sell 2003), but also the intensity and 
expansiveness with which patents have been sought. As a result of a radical 
future orientation, “in the absence of any tangible assets or actual profits, 
what the biotech start-up can offer is a proprietary claim over the future life 
forms it might give rise to, along with the profits that accrue from them” 
(Cooper 2008, p. 28).
Elsewhere, I explore at length how nanotechnology is currently outdoing 
biotechnology at the level of the exuberance of its promissory notes (López 
2004b; López 2008). In part this is a consequence of how nanotechnology is 
discursively positioned vis-à-vis the question of the ecological, natural, and 
social limits of economic growth. At present the field of nanotechnology 
remains rather fluid and heterogeneous (cf. López 2004b; López 2008).
Typically, though, nanotechnology is defined in terms of the ability to work at 
the nanoscale — a nanometer equals 1 billionth of a meter — but more 
importantly to work with physical, chemical, or biological properties that 
exist at this scale. Defined thus, the potential associated with nanotechnology 
has been extrapolated in a number of ways. For instance, it is possible to 
envision nanoarchitectures that will enable the interface of organisms and 
machines with high degrees of precision leading to a new generation of 
pharmaceutical compounds, vectors for their delivery, tissue regeneration, as 
well as a new class of medical diagnostic, visualization and monitoring 
devices. Beyond biomedicine, new nano-engineered computing and 
communications frameworks have the potential not only to provide speedier 
and exponentially more powerful computing capabilities, but also the 
fabrication of physical and biological environments endowed with sensing 
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devices rendering them both intelligent and adaptable. Furthermore, since it 
is at the nanoscale where the major macroscopic properties (strength, 
malleability, conductivity, etc.) are defined, all manner of stronger, more 
conductive and flexible materials have been anticipated. Finally, the 
expectation is that all of these dimensions will synergistically interact with 
each other producing multiplier effects where for example new materials will 
increase computing power that will enable the fabrication of more efficient 
biosensors, which will loop back into the production of yet more enhanced 
materials, etc.  
Despite the lack of uniformity, or perhaps precisely because of it, the 
emergent field of nanotechnology has been framed around a discursively 
powerful metaphor: the nanotechnology scientist as the master builder. 
Frequently, in nanotechnology texts, nature is anthropomorphised into an 
engineer that assembles matter one atom at a time. In this way, as with 
biotechnology, nanotechnology is discursively positioned as reproducing 
natural processes, thus in important ways not being a technology at all and 
just being nature’s way of doing things, 100% naturally as it were. Moreover, 
as I show elsewhere (López 2004b; López 2008) insofar as it is claimed that 
nanotechnology scientists work on and with the fundamental “building 
blocks” of reality, nanotechnology is framed as “the builder’s final frontier” 
(Smalley cited in López [2004a, p. 133]), and it becomes possible to conceive 
of re-building the world (inorganic, organic and social!) one atom at a time. 
In this manner, nanotechnology is able to overcome the future claims of 
biotechnology that for all of their exuberance remained tied to the domain of 
the organic world, of life itself. Unsurprisingly, the claims made on behalf of 
biotechnology’s ability to overcome physical, economic, organic, social and 
environmental limits have been reissued by the promoters of nanotechnology, 
but in a new re-engineered and upgraded form, version 2.0 so to speak 
(López 2008).
In spite of the attempt to f irst twin biotechnology and now 
nanotechnology with nature itself, this frame has been highly contested. One 
need not accept the epochal characterisation of the emergence of risk society 
or the second modernity thesis (Beck 1992) in order to recognise the 
significance of risk for contemporary social formations. Chernobyl, Bhopal, 
DDT, Thalidomide, BSE, Climate Change amongst others have served, as 
Sheila Jasanoff has argued, “collective notice that human pretensions of 
control over technological systems need serious re-examination” (Jasanoff 
2003, p. 223). One of the effects of this call to order has been the enlargement 
of the constituencies empowered to participate in the determination of risks, 
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specially as Jerry Ravetz has argued in the context of decisions about safety 
where “facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions 
urgent” (Ravetz 2005, p. 45). Moreover, the hyperbolic claims made on behalf 
of biotechnology — i.e. a new industrial era, miraculous cures, harnessing life 
itself, sourcing the code of life, deciphering and rewriting the book of life — 
have provoked negative reactions of great intensity apropos the prospects of 
new eugenic projects and new modalities of genetic discrimination, the 
dangers of playing God, the patenting and commercialisation of organisms 
and life processes, Frakenfoods, biopiracy, and irreversible environmental 
damage. In the case of nanotechnology, its utopian projections have 
unsurprisingly elicited equally dystopian responses, e.g. the grey-goo 
hypothesis, but also less catastrophic yet substantial concerns with respect to 
nanoparticle toxicity, control over the information gathered by nano-devices 
and their decision-making capacity, human enhancement and military 
applications. Consequently the contemporary dynamics of risk as they relate 
to scientific and technological development have made it possible to contest 
the autonomy of scientific progress by mobilising not only the potential for 
individual but also for collective harm.
In response to the politicisation of risk but also as a result of the need to 
mobilise and enable citizens to fulfill their roles in the knowledge society, 
governments at all levels (municipal, regional, national and transnational) 
have been concerned with developing new modes of governance, or of rule, 
that are productive of scientific citizenship. Neoliberal rhetoric to the 
contrary, the rationalities of neoliberal governance are not just restricted to 
rolling-back the state but have also involved rolling it out in particular 
spheres. These have taken a number of different forms such as stimulating 
interest in science and technology, promoting scientific literacy and 
developing new strategies for improving the public understanding of science, 
the identification of relevant stakeholders, public consultation and 
deliberation, citizen’s juries, consensus conference, etc. (cf. Irwin and Michael 
2003). Although these represent attempts to mobilise support for the relevant 
technologies and rationalities of scientific citizenship, they have also provided 
points where and around which opposition and resistance have been and can 
be expressed. 
In addition to these initiatives, a number of ELSI (Ethical Legal and 
Social Implications of genomics, nanotechnology, etc.) programmes have 
been launched. The first ELSI programme was created as a component of the 
US Human Genome Project, the US contribution to the international effort 
to sequence the human genome. An artefact of the knowledge society, it was 
90 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY, Vol. 40 No. 1, June 2011
tasked with anticipating and resolving problems and contributing to the 
development of policy that would maximise the benefits for individuals and 
society, as well as stimulating public discussion. Since then, “ELSIfication” has 
become de rigour with all new major scientific initiatives. ELSI programs 
have been criticised widely because they have been perceived as being too 
closely aligned with the objectives of the scientific endeavours that they were 
meant to scrutinise (cf. López and Robertson 2007), and as a consequence 
have been relegated to the role of facilitating the development and adoption 
of new technologies (Williams 2006, p. 334). 
As we have shown in our analysis of the development of ELSI in Canada 
(López and Robertson 2007), bioethicists and legal scholars, the same groups 
that contributed to the development of patients’ rights, were well positioned 
to expand their epistemological jurisdiction over a so-called interdisciplinary 
field that was bizarrely defined by the absence of an empirical or conceptual 
object of analysis. They were able to scale up the tools for the governance of 
the relationships between human subjects and research to the societal 
governance of biotechnology. An interesting illustration can be found in the 
now disbanded Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee’s (CBAC) 
effort to include Canadians in the governance of biotechnology. The 
committee reasoned that given the impossibility of physically including all 
Canadians they could do so through the proxy of Canadian values, i.e. if the 
values of Canadians were the ones used to govern biotechnology then in 
effect Canadians would be participating, albeit indirectly. Stunningly, the 
values that CBAC generated as Canadian values were in fact those values 
used to regulate research on human subjects, with a few minor modifications 
(López and Robertson 2007). 
Because, by the 1990s, when the US and the Canadian ELSI projects 
were launched, bioethics was well institutionalised and the link to the 
Nuremberg Code, the UDHR and ICCPR had been retroactively established, 
human rights became an integral component of bioethics’ ELSI discourse (cf. 
Knoppers 1991). Moreover, ELSI represented the instutionalization of one of 
the elements that had contributed to the emergence of patient rights. As I 
noted above, the process that produced the Belmont Report was described as 
a new way of doing ethics: “‘a philosophy of the people’ — a system that 
would represent how the public would make decisions if given the 
opportunity” (Evans 2002, p. 73). Thus insofar, as ELSI programs recognise 
that science impacts citizens and society and its effects should be scrutinized, 
it provides citizens with the right to constrain science’s autonomy, but only by 
proxy, through the intermediary of a social technology for the production of 
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consensus.  Equally, the global scope of biotechnology (Thacker 2005) offered 
a good fit with the universalistic aspirations of human rights tools. In 
addition to this, whereas in the UDHR the reference to the membership in 
the “human family” seemed vague if not metaphysical, in the UDHGHR the 
claim that “the human genome underlines the fundamental unity of all 
members of the human family” provides a tangible material basis for the 
familial reference. This is because the human genome is simultaneously 
individual and collective: the complex interaction of each person’s genome 
with their environment is what makes them unique but also links them to 
humanity’s past, present and future. Indeed the Canadian but internationally 
networked bioethicist Bartha Knoppers has argued that the informatic and 
genomic revolutions, the internationalisation of bioethics, and the adoption 
of the declaration, have given rise to a third generation of human rights 
(Knoppers 2000, p. 259). What are we to make of this claim? In my 
concluding remarks, I summarise the implications of the processes that have 
led to science’s loss of autonomy and what they entail for a sociological 
understanding of human rights vis-à-vis science.
Conclusion
I have argued that the feasibility of expanding the claims of human rights 
with respect to science beyond the parameters of informed consent, which 
itself only emerged in the US and elsewhere in the late 60s, had been blocked 
by the simultaneous linking of humanity’s ability to benefit from the progress 
of science to the latter’s autonomy, Vannevar Bush’s Endless Frontier. 
However, insofar as science’s autonomy has been reconfigured as a result of 
its mobilisation for the knowledge economy, initially through biotechnology 
and now also with nanotechnology, science has had to respond to a broader 
constituency and their interests, i.e. Mode 2 science. A number of critics have 
noted that the claim-making has been asymmetrical (cf. Delanty 2001, pp. 
112-13; Pestre 2003). Indeed, one can agree that science’s autonomy has never 
been so vulnerable, but that this vulnerability has been to capitalism’s 
advantage. That said, it has been biocapitalist practices such as intensive and 
extensive patenting strategies, the enforcement of intellectual property rights 
and bioprospection that have provoked human rights based responses and 
successes, i.e. the Third World Network and RAFI’s derailment of the Human 
Genome Diversity Project (M’charek 2005, p. 12), the development of profit 
sharing regimes (Parry 2004) and the numerous challenges to life form 
92 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY, Vol. 40 No. 1, June 2011
patents and pharmaceuticals related to the human rights to food and health 
(Sell 2001). Moreover, efforts to erase the “tech” from biotechnology and 
nanotechnology in order to “greenwash” them as well as attempts to frame 
these technologies as being capable of overcoming ecological, natural and 
social limits, have had the surely unwilled effect of  politicising risk leading to 
calls for and the development of  more collective modes of risk evaluation 
and decision making. This has lead to the reconfiguration of social relations 
and the creation of social practices through which the autonomy of science 
might be made subject to collectively designated goals and risk tolerance. 
Likewise, the need to develop modes of governance such as scientific 
citizenship in the knowledge society has produced some unintended 
consequences. By linking citizenship to science and technology, these 
processes, at least in a “normative moral aspiration” register, have produced a 
situation where it is increasingly difficult to address “citizenship or 
deliberation or accountability without delving into their interaction with the 
dynamics of knowledge creation and use” (Jasanoff 2005, p. 6). This in turn 
contains the potential for re-describing and reconfiguring the narrower civil 
and political rights to enable the democratisation and collective determination 
of the processes through which science and technology are steered. Equally, 
though ELSIism has on the whole been devoted to adapting the rights of 
informed consent and patient autonomy to the bio and nanotech era, the 
institutionalisation and the contemporary obligatory nature of ELSI type 
programs continue to provide sites in which and through which it is possible 
to expand rights vis-à-vis science.
I concluded the previous section by asking what one was to make of 
Bartha Knoppers’ proclamation of the arrival of the third generation of 
human rights represented by the adoption of the UDHGHR, which she 
describes as the culmination of an evolutionary process whose previous 
stages included political freedoms and civil rights, followed by socio-
economic rights. A careful reading of the declaration reveals, however, that 
despite the provision in Article 4 that “the human genome in its natural state 
shall not give rise to financial gains,” hardly an obstacle for biotech corporate 
lawyers, the focus is overwhelmingly on individual autonomy and the 
fostering of research development, with some ELSI type constraints. Not 
much of a departure from the UDHR or the ICCPR. In fact, the UDHGHR 
represents an attempt to internationalise science related human rights using 
the tools of informed consent and constraint via the ELSI proxy, the forms 
that science related human right have taken in the US and Canada. Moreover, 
less an attempt be made to mobilise human dignity to enunciate some type of 
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broader constraint on the freedom of scientific research, which could bypass 
ELSI’s control, as has been the case with stem cells research, some ELSIist 
have endeavoured to limit the development of this “dignitarian” discourse by 
tethering science related human rights tightly to informed consent, 
individual autonomy, and rational consensual policy making (cf. Caulfield 
and Brownsword 2006), a sure way of reducing politics to ethics (cf. López 
and Robertson 2007).
Seen thus, there is not much to be hopeful about. However if one 
conceptualises science related human rights as ordinary object of analysis, as 
I have attempted to do in this paper, it is possible to be a slightly more 
optimistic. As a consequence of the way in which science’s sacred autonomy 
has been eroded by the ordinary social-structural processes described above, 
the “moral normative aspiration” of expanding human rights vis-à-vis science 
now has the potential of being coupled with a number of emerging 
mechanisms, institutions and social surfaces, though this does not mean that 
they will. Moreover, insofar as some of these are a response to the neo-
liberalisation of science, they draw or could draw on other efforts that have 
mobilised human rights in order to roll back the contemporary reach of 
global capitalism (Blau and Moncada 2005).
In this paper my emphasis, driven by my empirical objects of analysis, 
has been on some of the broader trends in the US, Canada, and Europe and 
some aspects of the globalisation of bioethics and ELSIism. A sociological 
understanding of the ordinariness of science related human rights would 
need to explore some of these mechanisms, institutions, and social spaces in 
more detail in order to explain for instance why genetically modified 
organisms have been framed as a human rights issue in Europe but not in the 
US (cf. Jasanoff 2005). Naturally, a more cosmopolitan research agenda 
would need to be undertaken in order to explore the prospects of 
constraining science’s autonomy in contexts governed by different cultural 
and social structural configurations. It would also need to address the impact 
of the other significant technologies associated with the knowledge society, 
information and communications technologies, which I have not dealt with 
here but which are elaborately entwined with both bio and nanotechnology.
In addition to making human rights as they relate to science and 
technology sociologically ordinary, and unfortunately this is a point that I can 
only make in passing here, human rights would need to be conceptualised as 
hybrid as well. In invoking the notion of hybridity in this context, I am 
referring to what must certainly be the Archimedean point around which 
contemporary science studies has developed: the problematisation of the 
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nature/social distinction by conceptualising social life as being constituted 
not only through relations among social things but also through relations 
with non-human “natural” things (cf. Latour 1993). There are important 
metatheoretical consequences associated with summoning the idea of 
hybridity as conceptualised in science studies. However, my purpose here is 
simply to draw attention to the fact that the different forms in which scientific 
and technological knowledge and practices materialise — e.g. bioinformatic 
databases, patents, “wet” databases,” synthetic biology — both determine and 
are determined by social relations. Consequently if we are serious about 
trying to understand the development of human rights as they impact and are 
impacted by fields such as biotechnology and nanotechnology, we have to 
conceptualise human rights as arising in a hybrid space, a field of relations 
that are simultaneously “social” and “natural.” This is not a rejection of 
scientific realism, but rather the recognition that scientific knowledge and 
practice represent the point where nature and the social meet and not a 
process where the latter is purified from the former. 
Let me briefly illustrate the importance of grasping the different ways in 
which scientific knowledge materialises the biological or the natural, and how 
these different materialities affect both the formation of rights as do 
conceptions of rights affect the products of science and technology. The 
emergence of protocols for profit sharing and biodiversity, especially in the 
context of bioprospection have been put forward as an illustration of a more 
enlightened and equitable human rights approach to the question of who 
should benefit from developments in biotechnology. However, contemporary 
biotechnology as Eugene Thacker (2005) has shown, has to be understood as 
a series of material, social, and economic practices where biological processes 
are encoded into information, recoded through sophist icated 
bioinformatically enabled tools where the information is mined and or 
recombined, and then decoded into material artefacts such as a drugs, 
organisms or diagnostic devices. One of the consequences of bioinformatics 
becoming dominant, though not necessarily determinate, in biotechnology is, 
as Browlyn Parry has shown in her study of the commodification of 
bioinformation, that biological resources
can now be conveyed in a partially decorporealized or even wholly 
informational form, as a sample of genetic material, a biochemical extract, 
or even a coded sequence of DNA. When in these forms, they are more 
transmissible, modifiable and replicable. These factors have acted to create a 
new economy in bio-information, but they will also serve to make this new 
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economy particularly difficult to regulate (Parry 2004, p. 100).
In this context the profit sharing protocols become more difficult to enforce 
while the intellectual proprietary rights that ensue from the dry lab are 
strengthened. Similarly, as the ETC group has noted in its report on 
nanotechnology patents, while the “patenting of life” in the form of novel 
organisms, re-engineered tissues or other biological processes has caused 
much public concern, little notice has been taken of the patenting practices of 
the nanotechnology industry. However, the patenting of enabling tools, 
processes and materials at the nanoscale in fact could lead to proprietary 
claims that are potentially more wide ranging than those found in the field of 
biotechnology, thus authorising new forms of the economic exploitation of 
nature and requiring new strategies in order to enable communities to defend 
their rights over traditional herbal and medicinal remedies (ETC Group 
2005).
Finally, I would like to conclude by addressing how sociology might 
contribute to a normative grounding of human rights vis-à-vis science. In 
order to do so, I would like to invoke two notions that are central to the 
development of human rights more generally, i.e. harm and vulnerability, in 
order to suggest that they need to be rethought in the context of science 
related human rights. Much of the normative power associated with human 
rights derives, as Bryan Turner has argued, from our common vulnerability 
to pain and suffering, which arises from our physical embodiment and the 
fragility of social institutions. It is the certainty that torture produces pain, 
that inequality produces ill-health, that a lack of access to food produces 
starvation, and that the absence of recognition and political and social rights 
produce suffering that makes human rights so compelling and the need to 
institutionalize them so urgent. However, if we have learnt anything from the 
immense body of research produced by the social studies of science it is that 
scientific and technological development is non-linear and frequently 
radically unpredictable. Our fragility vis-à-vis scientific and technological 
development does not arise from the certainty of harm but rather from the 
lack of certainty. 
I think that it is important not to confuse an argument for the expansion 
of human rights vis-à-vis science with an argument against science. Only a 
Luddite would deny the prospect that biotechnology and nanotechnology 
will produce innovations that will be beneficent and socially useful. However, 
only hubris could make us think that these technologies can be developed 
without causing harm and perhaps even producing irreversible catastrophic 
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events. It is for this reason that I think we should think about science related 
human rights not primarily as a mechanism for introducing prohibitions on 
scientific practice, though in some cases this may be necessary, but as a way 
of developing social practices and rights that recognise our common fragility 
vis-à-vis the unknown and unknowable. What I have in mind is conveyed by 
Sheila Jasanoff ’s notion of technologies of humility:
 
that is to say methods and habits of thoughts, that try to come to grips with 
the ragged fringes of human understanding – the unknown, the uncertain, 
the ambiguous and the uncontrollable. Acknowledging the limits of 
prediction and control, technologies of humility confront ‘head-on’ the 
normative implications of our lack of perfect foresight. (Jasanoff 2003, p. 22)
Such an understanding provides a powerful normative grounding for science 
related human rights that arise from our shared fragility vis-à-vis the 
unknown that scientific development represents.
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